In experiments, subjects are often not indifferent among all sources of uncertainty; between two prospects yielding the same distribution of monetary rewards, they may strictly prefer one over the other. We formulate a special case of α-maxmin expected utility theory in a Savage setting, show that every decision maker perceives multiple subjective sources, and that source-utilities are rank dependent expected utility. A power series identifies each source, measures source-uncertainty, and determines the agent's sourcespecific risk attitude. Subjective sources connect Ellsberg-paradox behavior with source preference and with Allais-paradox behavior.
Introduction
In experiments, many subjects exhibit behavior inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory. These subjects either violate the independence axiom (Allais-style evidence 1 ) or choose among bets in a way that is inconsistent with a subjective probability (Ellsberg-style evidence 2 ); or they reverse their ranking of risky prospects when the source of the uncertainty changes (source-preference evidence 3 ). Numerous theoretical papers deal with the first 4 or the second 5 phenomenon and some deal with the third. 6 In this paper, we show that a special case of a standard model, α−maxmin expected utility (α−MEU) theory, can address all three.
We start with a preference over Savage acts with monetary prizes and give axioms that are equivalent to the following representation: the decision maker has a set of priors Π µ such that the utility W (f ) of a real-valued act f is
where v is the utility index and α ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter of uncertainty aversion. The set Π µ consists of all possible extensions of µ; that is, Π µ is the set of all priors that agree with the prior µ on its domain (the σ-algebra E µ ). We refer to the elements of E µ as ideal sets. Hence, the representation above suggests that the agent is completely ignorant about probabilities beyond the bounds implied by µ. We call our model Hurwicz expected utility theory (HEU) since it combines subjective expected utility theory with the Hurwicz α-criterion (Hurwicz (1951) ).
HEU preferences are the subset of α-MEU preferences identified by the restriction described above on the set of priors. By design, α-MEU addresses Ellsberg-style evidence and, as we show in Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) , the restriction on the set of priors does not diminish HEU's ability to a accommodate this evidence. In particular, HEU is flexible 1 Allais (1953) , Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) 2 Ellsberg (1961) 3 French and Poterba (1991) , Heath and Tversky (1991) 4 See Starmer (2000) for a survey of the theoretical and experimental literature on Allais-style evidence. 5 See Gilboa and Marinacci (2013) for a survey of the theoretical literature that addresses Ellsberg-style evidence.
6 Among the theoretical multi-source models are Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) , Nau (2006) , Ergin and Gul (2009) , Chew and Sagi (2008) , Abdellaoui et al. (2011). enough to accommodate all versions of the 2-prize Ellsberg paradox. 7 Here, we show how HEU can address source-preference and Allais-style evidence as well. The latter confronts agents with lotteries (over prizes) instead of Savage acts. The former considers situations in which agents reduce acts to lotteries as long as all the relevant uncertainty depends on a single "source." To analyze both of these phenomena together, we will identify circumstances when HEU agents are probabilistically sophisticated (Machina and Schmeidler (1992) ); that is, when they use a prior to reduce acts to lotteries. We call such a prior (and the associated σ−algebra of events) a source.
Consider a group of HEU agents with identical sets of priors Π µ but possibly different uncertainty attitudes (α, v) . A source for these agents is a prior π such that each agent in the group ranks bets on source events in accordance with the prior π. For example, suppose our agents must rank bets on an "ambiguous" Ellsberg urn containing different colored balls (c 1 , . . . , c n ) of unknown proportion. Quite plausibly, every agent in the group is indifferent between a bet on c i or c j and, more generally, ranks bets on A ⊂ {c 1 , . . . , c n } and B ⊂ {c 1 , . . . , c n } simply according to the cardinality of the two events. 8 In that case, the uniform prior on the colors of the urn is a source. 9 In Proposition 2 (and Proposition 2w), we show that HEU admits a rich collection of sources and characterize them. Sources are subjective in the sense that they are derived from the agents' rankings of Savage-acts over monetary prizes. Hence, in contrast to the urn example above, we do not assume coherent preferences over exogenously given collections of events; rather, we show that if preferences admit an HEU representation, there are multiple subjective sources.
A decision maker may consider the S&P500, the Democratic vote share in the next election, or draws of a roulette wheel a source. In each of these cases, the agent's betting preference might plausibly be compatible with a subjective probability. 10 Yet, as many 7 In Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) , we analyze expected uncertain utility theory, a more general model. However, for the special case of two prizes, the more general model analyzed in Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) and HEU coincide.
8 Notice that this agreement over the ranking of bets only holds when we restrict to bets on the ambiguous urn. It breaks down when comparing a bet on the ambiguous urn with a bet on an urn with known proportions of colored balls. In that case, the uncertainty attitude α will affect agents' rankings of bets.
9 Our definition of a source adds richness and continuity requirements. Specifically, the prior must be non-atomic and, thus, the source must contain a rich collection of events. 10 Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido and Wakker (2011) report experimental evidence for several sources of uncertainty, among them the French stock index, the temperature in Paris and two Ellsberg-style urns. For all but one of their sources, the authors cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects' betting preferences are compatible with a subjective probability. They estimate subjects' source-specific uncertainty attitudes and find that they vary with the source.
experiments have found, the preference may fail to be compatible with a probability if bets depend on two or more of those sources. Tversky and Fox (1995) and Tversky and Wakker (1995) coin the term source preference to describe this phenomenon. Two main conclusions emerge from experimental research on source-preference: first, subjects have a source preference not only when choosing between completely vague and probabilistically described sources (Chipman (1960) , Curley and Yates (1989) ) but also when choosing between sources with somewhat more or somewhat less vague specification or between sources about which they consider themselves to be more or less informed (Heath and Tversky (1991) ). Second, subjects tend to reverse their preference for less vague or more familiar sources when the probability of winning is small. When choosing between bets that have long-odds, subjects prefer vagueness (Curley and Yates (1989) ) or sources about which they know less (Heath and Tversky (1991) ). HEU agents with an intermediate level of uncertainty aversion exhibit the patterns of behavior found in the experimental literature on source preference. A power series characterizes each source and measures its uncertainty (Proposition 4). While maximally uncertainty averse agents (α = 1) always prefer bets on less uncertain sources, agents with an intermediate level of uncertainty aversion (0 < α < 1) reverse this preference when the probability of winning is low (Proposition 5). Hence, with α = 1, HEU theory accommodates the extreme uncertainty aversion suggested by Ellsberg's original experiment but when 0 < α < 1, HEU theory yields the more nuanced findings of subsequent empirical and experimental work.
Allais-style experiments confront subjects with lotteries; that is, acts that depend on a roulette wheel, on the draws of a card from a deck, or on some other objective randomization device. 11 In a subjective model such as ours, the randomization devices in Allais-style experiments are a source like any other; randomization devices need not yield the least uncertain or most preferred source nor do all randomization devices necessarily yield the same source. Indeed, Heath and Tversky (1991) provide experimental evidence showing 11 Of course, some experiments simply state probabilities without specifying a randomization device. We interpret this as a situation in which one of many possible randomization devices will be used to determine outcomes but the agent does not know which.
that agents may not favor sources based on randomization devices. 12 In addition, the experimental literature has found that measured risk attitudes vary with the experimental technique used to measure those attitudes. Thus, subjects differentiate among seemingly objective sources. 13 A (monetary) act that depends on a single source is a random variable and its cumulative distribution function is all that matters for an HEU-maximizer's utility. However, the function that maps these cumulatives to utilities is source-dependent. We refer to these functions as source utilities and show (Proposition 6) that they belong to the class of rank dependent expected utilities (RDEU, Quiggin (1982) ). RDEU has two parameters, a utility index (analogous to the von Neumann Morgenstern utility index) and a probability transformation function. The utility index is the same for all sources but the probability transformation function depends on the source's power series. In many sources, the resulting probability transformation function has an inverted-S shape, as typically used in applications that address Allais-style evidence. Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , Camerer and Ho, (1994) , Wu and Gonzalez, (1996) , Prelec (1998) and Abdellaoui (1998) provide evidence in favor of the inverted S-shape.
Risk aversion in a source depends on the agent's risk and uncertainty attitude (α, v)) but also on how uncertain she perceives the source to be. The latter effect is measured by the source polynomial. For a given source polynomial, the parameters α and v affect risk attitudes in a systematic way: a more concave utility index implies more risk aversion while greater uncertainty aversion (greater α) implies greater first order risk aversion; that is, a greater tendency to purchase full insurance at actuarially unfair odds. HEU agents perceive a range of sources of varying degrees of uncertainty and, therefore, we expect measured risk aversion to be context dependent, just as experimental and field studies find. 14 At the same time, HEU agents have stable, context-independent uncertainty attitudes as measured by v and α and, therefore, we expect the riskiness of agent's choices to be correlated across sources, as found in the empirical work of Einav et al. (2012) .
12 Specifically, Heath and Tversky (1991) show that subjects tend to prefer familiar "subjective" bets over equally likely bets on the outcome of a randomization device if these bets have a high probability of success.
13 See, for example, Dave et al (2010) . 14 See, for example, Isaac and James (2000) and Einav et al. (2012) .
Relation to the Literature
The HEU representation theorem is a special case of the representation theorem of expected uncertain utility theory (Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) ). We obtain HEU by strengthening one of the axioms of the earlier representation. Zhang's (2002) model of Choquet expected utility is a special case of HEU and corresponds to the case in which α = 1.
The theoretical literature contains relatively few multi-source models. Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) and Ergin and Gul (2009) 
The Model
The non-degenerate interval X = [l, m] is the set of prizes, Ω is the state space, and elements of F = {f : Ω → X, f (Ω) finite}, the set of simple Savage acts, are the choice objects. Our primitive is ≽, a binary relation on F.
To simplify the exposition, we use the following notational convention. For any property P, let {P} denote the set of all ω ∈ Ω at which P holds. For example, {f >
We identify x ∈ X with the constant act f = x. We write f Ag for the act that agrees with f on A and with g on A c , the complement of A.
A prior is a countably additive, complete, and non-atomic probability measure on some σ-algebra of subsets of Ω. Let Π denote the set of all priors and, for π ∈ Π, let 
The proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix shows that (1) is well-defined; that is, the minimum and the maximum above are attained. The σ-algebra E µ consists of the events the decision maker perceives to be least uncertain. If the act f is E µ -measurable, then
• f dµ and HEU reduces to subjective expected utility. To evaluate acts that are not E µ -measurable, the decision maker uses a Hurwicz-criterion (Hurwicz (1951)) applied to Π µ , the extensions of µ.
Proposition 1, below, is a representation theorem for HEU. To state the axioms for that result, we need the following definitions. The event A is null if f Ah ∼ gAh for all
Savage's sure thing principle (P2) is the requirement that every event is ideal. In HEU, ideal events represent the least uncertain events (corresponding to the events E µ in the representation) and the agent uses them to quantify the uncertainty of other, non-ideal,
for every non-null ideal event E. Diffuse events are the most uncertain events since they (and their complements) contain no (non-null) ideal events.
Let E be the set of all ideal events and D be the set of all diffuse events. We write An HEU has three parameters: the prior µ is the decision maker's perception of uncertainty, the utility index v is her risk attitude for ideal acts, and α is her parameter of uncertainty aversion. Standard arguments ensure the usual uniqueness properties of these parameters: µ and α are unique and v is unique up to positive affine transformations.
For the remainder of this paper, we fix µ, the agent's uncertainty perception, and let
Proposition 1 is closely related to Theorem 1 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) . There we provide a representation theorem for expected uncertain utility theory of which HEU is a special case. Only Axiom 4 differs in the two representations. Axiom 4, above, is Savage's comparative probability axiom, P4. It requires that the betting preference is prize-independent. By contrast, expected uncertain utility theory assumes this axiom only for ideal events and permits prize-dependent betting preference for general events.
15 For a detailed discussion of this axiom, see Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) .
Bets and Sources
A bet on A ⊂ Ω is a binary act prize y > x if A occurs and prize x if A c occurs. We write yAx for a bet on A. If W (yAx) ≥ W (yBx) for some y > x, then, by Axiom 4, the same inequality holds for all x, y with y > x. Therefore, we say that W prefers betting on A to betting on B and omit any reference to the two prizes. Henceforth, when we write yAx it is understood that y > x. Let
be the inner probability of an event B. Next, we express the utility of the bet yAx in terms of inner probabilities. For this bet, the least favorable extension of µ assigns A the (lower bound) probability µ * (A) while the most favorable extension of µ assigns A the (upper bound) probability 1 − µ * (A c ). 16 Therefore,
In general, the agent's uncertainty aversion, α, affects his ranking of bets. For example, Perhaps the best known example of multiple sources is the Ellsberg two-urn experiment. In it, subjects confront two urns: urn I consisting of balls with n colors of unknown proportions and urn II with exactly one ball for each of the n colors. In a single urn bet, the subjects are asked to bet on the color of a ball drawn from one of the urns. When comparing urn II bets, we would expect that a uniform probability over the n colors represents the betting preference of any agent because the odds of drawing each color is 1/n.
We would expect subjects to choose according to a uniform probability even among urn I bets. After all, the n different color events are equally uncertain; that is, uncertainty 16 See, Lemma 2, in the appendix for a proof of these assertions.
aversion provides no motive to favor one over another. Sources in our model share this feature: equally likely source events must be equally uncertain so that the agent's uncertainty attitude does not affect the ranking of bets.
The Ellsberg urn examples use a discrete state space whereas our model has a continuum of states. In our continuous setting, sources are (non-atomic) priors: π ∈ Π is a
Moreover, if A n ∈ E π and yA n x converges pointwise to yAx, then
We can compare our definition of a source to the Machina and Schmeidler (1992) 
Unlike Machina and Schmeidler, we allow the domain of the prior to be any σ-algebra and we restrict attention to bets. The first difference reflects our objective to study different sources and source preference; the second is for ease of exposition. It will turn out that the restriction to bets is inconsequential since, for E π -measurable acts, any prior that satisfies conditions (5) and (6) 
, and
Let Γ be the set of all power series and let δ n be the power series such that δ n (t) = t n .
For any prior π ∈ Π, we say that π conforms to the power series γ ∈ Γ if
for all A ∈ E π .
Proposition 2: (i) A prior is a source if and only if it conforms to some power series;
(ii) for every power series, there exists a source that conforms to it.
We write Σ ⊂ Π for the collection of sources. For π ∈ Σ, we let γ π denote π's power
To evaluate the utility of the bet yAx, we substitute (7) into expression (4) to obtain:
Note that expression (8) 
depends only on the probability of the source event (t = π(A))
and is otherwise independent of A. As a result, if we replace A with another, equally likely, source event B, then W (yBx) = W (yAx) for all α. Moreover, expression (8) is strictly increasing in t and, therefore, all agents prefer bets on more likely events. Thus, the prior π represents the betting preference for all W = (α, v). The continuity requirement follows from the continuity of γ π .
For the proof of the only if part of part (i), note that the utility of a bet on a source event must be a function only of its probability; moreover, by the continuity requirement, this function must be strictly increasing and continuous. This implies that equation (8) must hold for some continuous, strictly increasing function from [0, 1] to [0, 1]. The argument that this function must be a power series and that for each power series there is a conforming source is more involved. The main task in the proof of Proposition 2 is establishing these two facts.
Source Preference
In this section, we define a comparative measure of uncertainty for sources and a comparative measure of uncertainty aversion. We relate the former to the source's power series and the latter to preference parameters α and v.
The utility W is more uncertainty averse than the utilityW = (ᾱ,v) if wheneverW prefers betting on an event E ∈ E to betting on A, so does W .
Proposition 3: W = (α, v) is more uncertainty averse thanW = (ᾱ,v) if and only if α ≥ᾱ.
We omit the formal proof of Proposition 3 because it is straightforward: the utility of a bet on an ideal event E ∈ E does not depend on α while, by equation (4), increasing α decreases the utility of a bet on a non-ideal event A. Thus, of the two decision makers, the one with a smaller α assigns relatively less value to non-ideal bets.
Next, we derive a notion of comparative source uncertainty from the above notion of comparative uncertainty aversion. Let π o , π ∈ Σ be two sources. We say that W prefers 
for all t.
Proof: Let π, π o ∈ Σ be two sources and let A ∈ E π , B ∈ E π o be two events with the same source-probabilities (π(A) = π o (B)). Let W = (α, v) and letW = (ᾱ,v) be two utilities.
Consider bets with prizes y, x such that y > x and normalize
If γ π o ≥ γ π and if inequality (9) holds for α =ᾱ, then the same inequality holds for all α ≥ᾱ. It follows that π is more uncertain than π o . For the converse, note that if π is more uncertain than π o , then inequality (9) must hold for α = 1 and all t. It follows that
The simplest kind of source preference is an unequivocal preference for less uncertain sources. The Ellsberg two-urn paradox provides empirical evidence for this ranking. Subjects are told that both urns contain 100 balls. Urn II contains red and green balls but no additional information about the composition of urn II is given while urn I has exactly 50 white and 50 black balls. Subjects are asked to rank b, w, g, r where c is a bet that delivers y > 0 dollars if a ball of color c ∈ {b, w, r, g} is drawn and zero otherwise. Subjects tend to be indifferent between b and w and between r and g but strictly prefer the first two bets to the last two. This is source preference in its purest form: decision makers prefer the less uncertain urn. 
The utility W is uncertainty loving at poor odds if for any source π ∈ Σ, there is an uncertainty thresholdγ and an odds-thresholdt such that for π o ∈ Σ with γ π o ≤γ, W prefers π o to π at odds t ≤t. To illustrate the second part of Proposition 5, we substitute v(y) = 1, v(x) = 0, and (8) above and obtain:
Assume that 1 > α > 1/2 and let n 1 > n 2 . If t ≥ 1/2, the agent prefers a bet on the source with power series δ n 2 to an equivalent bet on the more uncertain source with power series δ n 1 . Thus, the agent prefers the bet on the less uncertain source if the odds of winning are good (t ≥ 1/2). By contrast, if the odds of winning are poor; that is, if t < 1 − α, and if n 1 sufficiently large, the agent prefers a bet on the source with power series δ n 1 to an equivalent bet on a source with power series δ n 2 ; that is, she prefers the bet on the more uncertain source.
Zhang Sources
Zhang (2002) provides the following urn experiment: a single ball is drawn from an urn with two balls. The balls are either red, white, green or blue. It is known that exactly one ball is red or white and exactly one ball is green or blue. Therefore, the agent might plausibly perceive the events A = {red, white} and B = {green, blue} as equally likely. It is also known that exactly one ball is either red or green and exactly one ball is white or blue 18 Curley-Yates and Heath-Tversky differ in how they identify more or less uncertain environments. In Curley and Yates decision makers identify one source as subjectively more uncertain when its description is more "vague." In Heath and Tversky more uncertain environments are environments about which decision makers perceive themselves to be less knowledgeable.
so that the agent plausibly perceives the events C = {red, green} and D = {white, blue} as equally likely. It is equally plausible that the agent would be indifferent between bets on any two of the four events A, B, C and D. By contrast, an agent who exhibits the typical pattern in the Ellsberg paradox likely prefers betting on A to betting on F = {red, blue}.
Note that F can be obtained as the union of intersections of events in {A, B, C, D} since D) . This suggests that the agent could plausibly perceive A, B, C and D to be part of a source that does not contain F . Therefore, the decision maker may have coherent betting preferences over collections of events and yet, it may not be possible to extend these preferences, in a coherent manner, to any algebra containing those events.
Zhang's example describes a λ-system rather than a σ-algebra. Moreover, if A n ∈ E π and yA n x converges pointwise to yAx, then
A class of events
We call a weak source a Zhang-source if betting preferences on (A, π) cannot be extended to any σ-algebra that contains A; specifically, we say that the weak source (A, π) is a Zhang-source if there is an event F in the smallest σ-algebra that contains A such that for some W = (α, v) and all A ∈ A with π(A) = 1/2 we have:
The event F matches the properties of the eponymous event in Zhang's example above: it is part of the smallest σ−algebra containing A; the agent is indifferent between a bet on F and a bet on F c and, finally, the agent prefers a bet on A ∈ A over a bet on F if A has probability 1/2.
Proposition 2w(i) shows that a λ-prior (A, π) is a weak source if and only if it conforms to a power series γ, i.e., µ * (A) = γ(π(A)) for all A ∈ A. Thus, weakening the definition of a source to λ-systems leaves our characterization result unaffected. 
Sources and Lottery Utilities
If an act is measurable with respect to the events of a source π, it is a random variable on the probability space (E π , π). Therefore, we can map it to a lottery; that is, a cumulative over monetary prizes. In Proposition 5, below, we show that the utility of this act depends only on this implied lottery and so each source brings about a utility function over lotteries, a lottery utility. In this section, we characterize these lottery utilities and
show how the uncertainty of the source (its power series) and the agent's uncertainty aversion (the parameter α) affects their risk posture.
Recall that X is the set of prizes. To simplify the presentation, we assume that X contains 0. Let L be the set of a cumulative distribution functions with support X. We write F ≫ G to denote stochastic dominance; that is, F ≤ G and F ̸ = G. We write F n ⇒ F to denote convergence in distribution; that is, lim n F n (x) = F (x) at every continuity point
whenever F is a mean preserving spread of G. The lottery utility V is more risk averse
19 In the proof of Proposition 2w, we provide an example of a Zhang-source that conforms to a quadratic power series. The quadratic power series seems inessential to the construction and, therefore, we conjecture that a stronger result is true: for every power series γ, there is a Zhang source that conforms to γ. 20 The lottery F is a compensated spread (Machina (1982) ) of G for the lottery utility
For any source π ∈ Σ, let F π denote the source-acts; that is, the collection of simple
As we show in Proposition 6 below, the lottery utilities of HEU-agents are rank dependent expected utility (RDEU, Quiggin (1982) ) in every source. RDEU is a well-known class of lottery utilities, commonly used in experimental studies that examine violations of the independence axiom (see, for example, the survey by Starmer (2000)). An RDEU has two parameters, a probability transformation function (PTF); that is, a continuous, increasing
, and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index. Let T be the set of all PTFs. For F ∈ L and τ ∈ T , the cumulative
the transformed lottery. The lottery utility V is RDEU if and only if there is a τ ∈ T and a continuous, strictly increasing function v : X → IR such that the utility of the lottery F is the expected utility of the transformed lottery F τ :
We write V τ v for the RDEU with utility index v and PTF τ .
The power series γ ∈ Γ is an example of a PTF; for any γ ∈ Γ, the dual (or conjugate) γ of γ, defined asγ(t) := 1 − γ(1 − t), is also a PTF and any weighted average of PTFs is a PTF. Proposition 6 characterizes the source utilities of HEU agents:
The utility index v is the same for all sources but the PTF depends on the source and on α. Note that each γ is convex and, conversely, eachγ is concave. Therefore, the PTF in each source is a weighted average of a convex PTF and its concave dual. For example, if γ π = δ n for some n ≥ 1, then
RDEU utility exhibits first order risk aversion and the uncertainty aversion parameter α is related to the level of first order risk aversion. Fix a lottery H ∈ L with zero mean.
For x ∈ X, define the lottery H tx as follows:
Thus, H tx is a t, (1 − t) mixture of H and the degenerate lottery that yields x for sure. 
The risk premium of that lottery is r(t), where v(x − r(t)) = V τ v (H tx
have these properties whenever 1/2 < α < 1 and γ places enough weight on higher order powers. More precisely, let γ = ∑ a i δ i and 1/2 < α < 1. Then, the probability transformation function has the above mentioned properties if
RDEUs with an inverted-S PTF are not globally risk averse because they prefer a gamble with sufficiently small odds of success over its expected value. As we show in Proposition 8, below, the only HEU utilities that are risk averse in every source are those with α = 1.
Proposition 8: For any W = (α, v), the following conditions are equivalent: (i) V τ v such that τ = αγ + (1 − α)γ is risk averse for every power series γ;
(iii) α = 1 and v is concave. In Gul and Pesendorfer (2014), we link uncertainty aversion to the agent's tendency to match the Ellsberg paradox. Here we have shown that the same parameter affects risk aversion in a systematic way: holding fixed the utility index v, more uncertainty averse agents exhibit greater first order risk aversion; they are more risk averse in any given source, and only maximally uncertainty averse agents can be risk averse in every source. 23 Schmeidler's definition implies that the capacity must be convex. HEU maximizers are Choquet expected utility maximizers (see Lemma 2 in the appendix) with a capacity that is convex if and only if α = 1.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a theory of subjective sources. Our model, Hurwicz expected utility, is a one-parameter extension of Savage's model that allows Ellsberg-paradox behavior. As in Savage, each agent has a prior and a utility index. The additional parameter, α, measures the agent's uncertainty aversion. Despite the model's closeness to subjective expected utility theory, it admits a rich collection of subjective sources. Within each source, the agent maximizes rank dependent expected utility with a source-dependent probability transformation function.
An implication of our model is that risk postures vary substantially depending on how uncertain decision makers perceive a source to be. Thus, we would expect that measured risk aversion is context-dependent, just as the experimental and empirical literature on risk posture observes. Estimates of risk aversion measure two conceptually distinct features of a decision maker: risk and uncertainty attitudes (as measures by the parameter α and the utility index v) and how uncertain the decision maker perceives the particular source to be (as measured by its power series γ.) While the former is context independent, the latter is not. Confounding the two may lead to the incorrect conclusion that overall preferences are context-dependent.
Appendix

Preliminaries
Cores, Diffuse Sets and Ideal Splits
Let µ ∈ Π and let E + µ = {E ∈ E µ : µ(E) > 0}. Recall that µ's inner probability µ * is defined as follows: µ * (A) = sup For any A ⊂ Ω, the core of A is a set E ⊂ A such that µ(E) = µ * (A). It is easy to verify that every A has a core and that this core is unique up to µ-equivalent sets. An alternative characterization of the core is as follows: E is the core of A if and only if every
For any nonempty, finite set K, let K * denote the set of all nonempty subsets of K.
Let {A 1 , . . . , A n } be any collection of pairwise-disjoint subsets of Ω and N = {1, . . . , n}.
An ideal split is a collection of pairwise-disjoint, µ-measurable sets {E J } J∈N * such that
We construct an ideal split for {A i } i∈N , inductively, as follows: when J is a singleton, let E J be the core of A i for the unique i ∈ J. Then, for J with cardinality n + 1, let
where E is the core of ∪ i∈J A i . Using the characterization of the core presented above, an inductive argument (on the cardinality of K) ensures that the construction above yields an ideal split. It is easy to verify that an ideal split is unique up to µ-equivalent sets. Hence, we will say "the ideal split" rather than "an ideal split." 
Envelope Functions and the EUU Representation
Let F * be the set of all functions from Ω to X. For µ ∈ Π, let F * µ ⊂ F * be the subset of
µ , the lower envelope of f , as follows:
the maximal µ-measurable act that lies below f . In Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) , we show that [f ] 1 exists and is unique up to a set of measure 0. The upper envelope [f ] 2 of f is defined analogously; i.e., by replacing ≥ in (i) and (ii) above with ≤. 
The proof of the representation theorem in Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) first shows that the representation holds for acts in F; i.e., simple acts.
Proof of Proposition 1
We will first show that Axiom 4 ensures that there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that satisfies the following:
Take any diffuse set D. Then, [mDl] 1 is the constant act l and [mDl] 2 is the constant act m. It follows from equation ( * ) above that
Hence, mEl ∼ mDl if and only if µ(E) = α. Choose any such E and y > x. Then, by
Axiom 4, yEx ∼ yDx and since W * represents ≽, we must have
as desired.
Define, v(x) = u(x, x) for all x ∈ X. Hence, we have shown that if ≽ satisfies Axioms 1-6, there exists a prior µ, α ∈ [0, 1] and a utility index v such that the function W defined
For the remainder of this section, let (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be the range of f ∈ F ordered so that x 1 < x 2 < . . . < x n and let
Proof: We will prove Lemma 1 for k = 1. The proof for k = 2 is analogous and, therefore, omitted. It is enough for us to show that µ( 
. . , n. Since the arguments for the two assertions are symmetric we will only proof the first. Since
To prove the reverse inequality,
Proof of Proposition 1: For the only if part of the proof, we will show that
We will prove the result for min
and, therefore, omitted.
is B. Clearly, B is a partition of Ω. Then, let E be the set of all sets that can be expressed
It is easy to verify that E is the is the smallest σ-algebra that contains both E µ and
Define, π as follows:
Note that π is the unique extension of µ to E such that π(
That π is a prior follows from the fact that µ is a prior. Note also that π(
and hence
Then, to conclude the proof, it is sufficient for us to show that for anyπ such that
Proof of Propositions 2 and 2w
Proof of Proposition 2(i) and 2w(i):
Since every prior is a λ-prior and every weak-source on a σ-algebra is a source, 2w(i) implies 2(i) and therefore, we will only prove the former.
Claim: Let x ni and y ni be two arrays such that 0 ≤ x ni , y ni ≤ 1 for all n, i = 1, 2, . . .. If, for some t, γ ∈ (0, 1) and sequence
Proof of the Claim: For any
Thus, we have
Let W = (µ, α, v), α = 1 and let (A, π) be a weak source. Then, 
whenever |J| = |L|. Hence, we can define
Hence, 0 ≤ a ni ≤ 1 for all n, i and therefore, with a diagonal argument, we can find a subsequence n m and a sequence a i , i = 1, . . . such that lim m→ a n m i = a i for all i. Without loss of generality, we will assume that this subsequence is the sequence n itself.
Let t ∈ (0, 1) be any dyadic number; hence t = k/2 m for integers k, m > 0. Then, for
n−m } and note that equation (A2) implies,
is the probability of drawing i red balls in i tries, without replacement, from an urn that has 2 n balls, k2 n−m of which are red, while t i is the corresponding probability when the draws are made with replacement. As n goes to infinity, the two probabilities become the same.
x ni = y ni = 0. Then, set z i = a i for all i and γ = γ(t) and verify that the assumptions of the claim are met to conclude To prove the converse, suppose for some λ-prior (A, π) and power series γ, µ * (A) = γ(π(A)) for all A ∈ A. Then, substituting π(A) into expression (8), we get
Since this expression is continuous and strictly increasing in π(A) for every (α, v) and y > x, the conditions for a weak source are satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2(ii):
Fix the prior µ and the power series γ such that
0 (z i )) = a i . As we noted in section 7.1, there exists a collection of pairwise disjoint diffuse sets
. . is a sequence of independent random variables. Define g ∈ F * as follows:
Let E g be the σ-algebra generated by g and let ν be the unique measure on the Borel
Then, define the probability measure (E g , π g ) as follows: π g (g −1 (B)) = ν(B) for every Borel B ⊂ X. Finally, let π be the completion 24 of π g . We claim that π is a prior and that
Since ν is nonatomic, so are π and π g . Hence, π is a prior.
Next, we prove (A4) for A ∈ E g . Let A = g −1 (B) and let 
) and let i be such that
It is easy to verify that for any
). Therefore, since (A4) holds for all A ∈ E g , it also holds for all
A ∈ E π . Hence, π conforms to the power series γ and part (i) of this proposition ensures that π is a source.
Proof of Proposition 2w(ii)
Let D 1 , D 2 be a partition of Ω into two diffuse sets. Choose four independent, uniformly distributed random variables, g i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 on (E µ , µ) with support X. Let
and let
Let ν be the unique measure on the Borel sets of X such that ν[l, x] = x−l m−l for all x ∈ X. For i = 1, 2, let (E π i , π i ) be the source constructed from f i as described in the proof of Proposition 2(ii). It is easy to verify that the power series of both of these sources is δ 2 .
To simplify the notation below, we write E 1 for E π 1 and E 2 for E π 2 .
Since π 2 (C) = 0 and π 2 (F ) = 1, we have π 2 (C c ) = 1 and π 2 (F c ) = 0; since π 2 is complete and
. To conclude the proof that E ′ 1 is a σ-algebra, we will prove that countable unions of
is well-defined, we make the following observation: given any π
To see why this is the case, note that π 2 (F ) = 1 implies µ * (F ) = 1 and since µ is complete,
F ∈ E µ and µ(F ) = 1. It follows that µ * (B ∩ F ) = µ * (B). Since π 2 (C) = 0, we have π 2 (C c ) = 1 and therefore, µ * (C c ) = µ(C c ) = 1. Hence, C ∈ E µ and µ(C) = 0. Therefore,
To verify that π
Next, we will show that π
We established above (while proving that E ′ 1 is closed under countable unions) that there is F ∈ E 2 such that π 2 (F ) = 1 and (
Since π 1 is a source, it is nonatomic. Then, π ′ 1 is also nonatomic. To establish that π ′ 1 is a prior, all that remains is to show that it is complete: 
Assertion (1) follows easily from the way E ′ 1 , E ′ 2 are constructed. In particular, it follows from the fact that the functions g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 are independent. To prove (2), without loss of generality, let i = 1 and (B ∪ C) ∩ F be a We will show that A is a λ-system and that π is a λ-prior. Since E 
( 1 2
Hence, π(F ) = π(F c ) = 1/ √ 8, a contradiction. To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that lim t→0 (w(t)/r(t)) < 1. It is easy to verify that γ is differentiable for all t < 1 and that γ ′ (t) ≥ 1 for t ∈ [1 − ϵ, 1) for some ϵ > 0.
Proof of Proposition
Therefore, using l'Hopital's rule, we obtain:
(1 − α)n(γ ′ (t)) n−1 ≤ α + 1 − α (1 − α)n ≤ 1/2
Proof of Proposition 6
Let W = (α, v) and let x 1 < x 2 < . . . < x n be the prizes in the support of f ∈ F π , π ∈ Σ. By Lemma 2,
Proposition 2 implies that
and, therefore,
The Proposition now follows since α
Proof of Proposition 7
Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) 
Proof of Proposition 8
First, we will show that (i) implies (iii). If v is not concave then W is not risk averse for π ∈ Σ with γ π = δ 1 . So, assume v is concave and α < 1. Fix y > x and choose
> t > α such that αv(x) + (− α)v(y) > v(tx + (− t)y).
Since v is continuous and concave such a t exists. Let F be the lottery that yields x with probability t and y with probability 1 − t and let z = tx + (1 − t)y. Then, V τ n v (F ) > v(z) for τ n = αδ n + (1 − α)δ n and n sufficiently large. Hence, W is not risk averse in every source.
Next, we will prove (iii) implies ( Then, the characterization of uncertainty aversion in Schmeidler (1989) (i.e., the proposition on page 582) and the convexity of µ * ensure that
where the integrals above are Choquet integrals. The concavity of v ensures that W (βf +
(1 − β)g) ≥ W (h) and therefore, W (βf + (1 − β)g) ≥ W (f ) as desired.
To prove (ii) implies (i), consider any source π ∈ Σ. Then, f, g ∈ F π implies βf +
(1 − β)g ∈ F π . Theorem 5 of Ergin and Gul (2009) 
